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Abstract
We design an experiment that closely emulates and tests the standard model of complete
competitive markets, without imposing parametric restrictions on preferences. Consistent with
theory, aggregated elicited supply and demand curves cross at the expected dividend when
there is no aggregate risk, and at a lower price when there is aggregate risk. In contradiction
with theory, individual participants frequently make choices that violate rst order stochastic
dominance. We propose a random choice model which reconciles the above mentioned ndings
and is also consistent with additional features of the data, such as, e.g., large mistakes being
less frequent than smaller ones.
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal works of Debreu (1959) and Arrow (1964), the general equilibrium theory of
asset pricing and risk sharing in perfect and complete markets has o¤ered an elegant framework
and sharp implications: agents should share risk perfectly, which, in turn, implies that only
aggregate risk should be priced (Borch, 1962). Unfortunately, these implications are rejected
by eld data. Is it because human cognition and preferences do not conform to the standard
rational choice paradigm? Or is it because, in practice, markets are imperfect and incomplete?
These two potential explanations have very di¤erent implications for further research. The
former calls for new models of human decisionmaking, whereas the latter emphasizes the need
to model market imperfections. While it is di¢ cult to disentangle these two explanations with
eld data, in the lab it is possible to do so. In a controlled experimental setting one can make
sure the market is perfect and complete. Any deviation from the implications of rational choice
and competitive equilibrium can then be attributed to human cognition.
To study this issue, we conduct an experimental analysis of the simplest possible setting in
which the basic tenets of the theory can be tested. The state of the world ! can take only two
values (u and d) and there are two non-redundant assets (a stock and a bond), so the market is
complete. At the beginning of each of 8 trading rounds, participants start with heterogeneous
endowments (stocks, bonds and other statecontingent income). Individual demand and supply
functions (specifying how many shares the participant wants to buy or sell at di¤erent prices)
are elicited. Participants are asked to choose the quantity they want to buy or sell at all
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prices on a grid. For half the rounds of the experiment, the market price is randomly drawn
and thus participants have no opportunity to manipulate the price.1 During the other rounds,
in contrast, participants are informed that the price is set to minimize the di¤erence between
aggregate supply and aggregate demand. Empirically, we observe similar behaviour within these
two di¤erent pricesetting mechanisms. This suggests that our experimental design is able to
generate a situation in which agents behave competitively, as in the standard competitive
equilibrium model.2
The simplicity of our experimental setting enables us to pin down precisely the implications
of rational choice for individual behaviour and market outcomes for a large class of preferences.3
 At the individual level, our experimental design enables us to test the hypothesis that par-
1This is in the same spirit as Becker, DeGroot, Marschak (1964). They i) ask a seller to quote a reservation
price, ii) randomly draw a buying price, and iii) let the seller trade 1 unit at the buying price if the latter is
above the reservation selling price. While in that mechanism trades are only for one unit, our random price
mechanism can be seen as an extension of the Becker, DeGroot, Marschak (1964) to general supply or demand
curves.
2Our market environment is similar to the call market in Smith, Williams, Bratton, and Vannoni (1982),
McCabe, Rassenti and Smith (1993) or Plott and Pogolreslskyi (2015). The main di¤erences are that i) they
let participants submit limit orders, while we elicit demand functions, and ii) our design enables us to test if
participants are competitive. Bohm, Linden and Sonnegard (1997) compare the performance of a market mech-
anism with that of a Becker, DeGroot, Marschak (1964) mechanism in eliciting the private value of participants
for one unit of a commodity.
3That class includes risk averse, risk loving or risk neutral expected utility, as well as rank dependent expected
utility.
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ticipants are rational. We show that some actions are rst order stochastically dominated.
Rational choice, therefore, implies they should not be observed in the lab.
 At the market level, our experimental design enables us to test the hypothesis that par-
ticipants are risk averse and share risk e¢ ciently. We consider two treatments. In the
rst treatment there is no aggregate risk. So participants can perfectly hedge their risky
endowments and the price of the stock should be equal to the expected dividend. In
the second treatment there is aggregate risk. So, with risk-averse agents, the stock price
should be lower than the expected dividend.4
We ran the experiment with 141 students in Toulouse University. There were 8 cohorts.
Each participated in 8 replications of the experimental market. Participantscompensation was
a linear function of their gains in two randomly drawn replications (with an average of 85.84
euros per participant).
Aggregate outcomes, in our experimental market, are consistent with the implications of
rational choice. When there is no aggregate risk, market clearing prices are close to expected
dividends, and average trading volume is close to that requested by perfect risk-sharing. With
aggregate risk, there is a risk premium, consistent with a relative risk aversion coe¢ cient close
4The two treatments alternate from one round to the next. While market participants know their own
endowment, they have no information about the endowments of the others or the alternance between the two
treatments. This is in line with competitive Walrasian equilibrium, where agents only need to contingent
decisions on the price, and do not engage in strategic interactions with one another.
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to .5 for the representative agent.
Observed individual behaviour, however, markedly di¤ers from that predicted by rational
choice. Around 30% of observed actions are rst order stochastically dominated. The frequency
of dominated actions, however, declines with experience, from approximately 34% in the rst
replication to 24% in the last replication. Probit regressions, in which the dependent variable
is the indicator that the action is dominated, conrm that there is signicant learning. They
also show that, when an agent opted for a dominated action in a given round, he/she is likely
to continue to do so at the next round, except if the action led to a loss-making trade. The
latter suggests that agents learn from costly mistakes.
To reconcile aggregate and individual ndings, we propose a model of bounded rationality.
In line with random choice models (Luce, 1959, McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995, 1998), we posit
that participants play randomly but put more weight on actions delivering larger value. We
show that the distribution of individual actions predicted by this model is consistent with that
observed in the lab: As mentioned above, rst order stochastically dominated actions are less
frequent than undominated ones, which is in line with the predictions of the random choice
model. Furthermore, in our simple experimental setting we are able to identify large and
smallmistakes, such that, while both are dominated by rational actions, large mistakes are
second order stochastically dominated by small mistakes. In line with the predictions of the
random choice model for risk averse agents, we nd that large mistakes are less frequent than
small ones. We also show (analytically) that the actions generated by the random choice model
aggregate to supply and demand curves which, like those we observe in the lab, generate market
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pricing and average trading consistent with rational choice.
Our work is directly in line with the insightful analyses of Bossaerts and Plott (2004) and
Bossaerts, Plott and Zame (2007).5 Like them we study the consequences of risk aversion in
complete experimental markets and nd prices involve riskpremia. Di¤erences between the
present paper and theirs include the following:
 The trading protocol we consider is di¤erent fromBossaerts and Plott (2004) and Bossaerts,
Plott and Zame (2007). They consider a continuous doubleauction, in which traders can
dynamically post and hit quotes. This is similar to the workings of electronic limit order
books in nancial markets during the day, and this is also in line with the seminal ex-
perimental studies of Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) and Plott and Sunder (1982,
1988). In contrast, we consider a competitive market environment in which participants
submit supply and demand functions which are aggregated and crossed to determine the
equilibrium price.
 While Bossaerts and Plott (2004) and Bossaerts, Plott and Zame (2007) consider a three
state model, we consider a twostate model. The advantage of a threestate complete
market is that there are two risky assets, so that portfolios of risky assets can be analyzed.
This enables Bossaerts and Plott (2004) and Bossaerts, Plott and Zame (2007) to test
the hypothesis that agents hold the market portfolio. The problem with that design,
5While our theoretical framework is static, Bossaerts, Meloso and Zame (2013) and Crockett and Du¤y
(2013) o¤er interesting analyses of equilibrium market dynamics.
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however, is that participants must trade several risky assets. Such a market is di¢ cult to
organize and cognitively challenging for participants. Our design is simpler since we only
have two assets: the riskfree bond and the risky stock. Thus agents need to trade in
only one market, where the risky asset is exchanged for the riskfree bond. Moreover, as
mentioned above, the simplicity of our setting enables us to obtain precise implications
for a large class of preferences.
 While Bossaerts and Plott (2004) and Bossaerts, Plott and Zame (2007) consider markets
in which there is always aggregate risk, we also consider a treatment in which there is no
aggregate risk, while individual endowments are risky. This enables us to test a very basic
implication of theory that does not arise in Bossaerts and Plott (2004) and Bossaerts,
Plott and Zame (2007): In complete markets without aggregate risk, i) agents should
bear no risk and ii) this should give rise to risk-neutral pricing.
Our nding that aggregate behaviour is well behaved, while individual behaviour is noisy,
echoes that of Bossaerts, Plott and Zame (2007). Their CAPM+ model assumes that an
individual traders demand function is the sum of a mean-variance optimal demand and a noise
term. Our random choice model allows for a large class of preferences (expected utility with
any curvature, rank dependent expected utility). Moroever, in our simple experimental design,
our random choice model imposes structure on the distribution of individual actions, which we
confront to the experimental data.
The present paper is also related to the experimental literature studying the consequences
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of riskaversion for economic and nancial decisions. Holt and Laury (2002) observe lottery
choices consistent with risk-aversion. Experimental ndings are also suggestive of risk aversion
for private value auctions (Goeree, Holt and Palfrey, 2002), asymmetric matching penny games
(Goeree, Holt and Palfrey, 2003), and oneshot matrix games (Goeree and Holt, 2004).6 In
Bossaerts and Plott (2004) market pricing is consistent with risk aversion, since assets with
large betas have greater expected returns than assets with low beta. Our experimental nding
that with no aggregate risk prices are equal to expected dividend, while with aggregate risk
prices are below aggregate dividend, o¤ers additional evidence consistent with risk aversion.
Section 2 presents our experimental design. Section 3 presents testable implications of ratio-
nal choice in our complete market experimental setting. Section 4 confronts these implications
with experimental evidence. Section 5 presents a random choice model and shows it rationalises
experimental ndings. Section 6 concludes.
2 Experimental Design
The purpose of our experimental design is to closely emulate and test the standard model of
complete competitive markets, without imposing parametric restrictions on preferences.
6The majority of participants in Holt and Laury (2002) have estimated relative riskaversion between .15
and .97. Estimates of the same order of magnitude have been found by Goeree et al (2002, 2003) and Goeree
and Holt (2004).
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Assets: There are two equally likely states of nature, ! = u; d, and two non-redundant
assets, a bond and a stock. Hence markets are complete. One unit of the bond pays 1 in each
state of nature. One share of the stock pays 120 in state u and 0 in state d. To implement
complete markets in our two-state experimental setting, it is enough to consider one market,
in which the stock is traded against the bond; that is, we take the bond as the numï¿1
2
raire.7
We denote by S the price of the stock relative to the bond.
Although considering only two assets precludes analyzing portfolios of risky assets, it side-
steps the di¢ culties associated with simultaneous trading in several experimental markets that
have been emphasized by Bossaerts and Plott (2004) or Bossaerts, Plott, and Zame (2007).
Moreover, having only one market in which the stock can be traded against the bond simpli-
es the cognitive task faced by participants. If, by contrast, we had considered two markets in
which the stock and the bond could be traded against a perishable unit of account, participants
would have faced a more di¢ cult task: they would have had to factor their trades on the two
markets into their budgets constraints, and to compare prices on the two markets.
Endowments: Participants endowments come from their initial holdings of bond and
stock, and from state-contingent additional income. We will consider two treatments. In
Treatment 1, there is no aggregate risk: the sum of individual endowments is constant across
states of nature. In Treatment 2, there is aggregate risk: the sum of individual endowments
7The mapping between the complete-market environment and our experimental setting is explicited in the
online appendix.
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is larger in state u than in state d. We chose this design because, as explained in the next
subsection, it enables us to test sharp predictions of the theory.
For simplicity, participants can receive only three types of endowments:
1. Type 1 participants initially receive 5 shares of the stock and no bond. Their additional
income is 0 in state u and 360 in state d. Thus their endowments are 600 in state u and
360 in state d.
2. Type 2 participants initially receive no stock and 310 bonds. Their additional income is
0 in state u and 240 in state d. Thus their endowments are 310 in state u and 550 in
state d.8
3. Type 3 participants initially receive no stock and 310 bonds. They have no additional
income. Thus their endowment is 310 in both states u and d.
In Treatment 1, if the number of participants is even, there are only Type 1 and Type
2 participants, in equal numbers; whereas if the number of participants is odd, there is one
additional Type 3 participant. This treatment corresponds to a situation with no aggregate
risk.
In Treatment 2, if the number of participants is even, there are Type 1 and Type 3 partici-
pants, in equal numbers; whereas if the number of participants is odd, there is one additional
Type 3 participant. This treatment corresponds to a situation with aggregate risk.
8The endowments for Type 1 and Type 2 participants have been chosen so that both are fully hedged if they
trade 2 shares, as discussed in the next section.
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Participants do not know that there are two treatments. At each replication of the exper-
iment, they are only informed about their own endowments and the distribution of the divi-
dend. This is in line with the standard competitive equilibrium model, in which agents only
rely on prices and rational expectations about the distribution of future values, as emphasized
in Bossaerts and Plott (2004.)
Supply, demand and prices: Historically, experimental economics relied on the contin-
uous double auction to study market equilibrium in the lab. As noted by Bossaerts (2008):
The very quest for an institution capable of generating the (Walrasian) com-
petitive equilibrium ended up dening experimental economics... What established
economics as an experimental science was proof that the continuous auction did the
job (Smith 1962, Plott and Smith 1978).
Yet, Bossaerts (2008) also notes:
The continuous double auction ... dees formal analysis in game theoretic
terms.
To avoid this pitfall, we design our experimental market to closely emulate the standard
competitive equilibrium model in which each participant states how much he/she wants to sell
or buy at each price, and the price is set to clear the market.
As explained below, if all agents are competitive and risk averse, in equilibrium, Type 1
agents never buy the stock, while Type 2 and Type 3 agents never sell it. To simplify the task
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of participants in the experiment, we therefore restrict Type 1 participants to supply, and Type
2 and 3 participants to demand nonnegative quantities of the stock. A further simplication is
that participants are restricted to trade quantities no greater than 4.9
Participants are asked which quantity they want to sell or buy at each point of a price grid
ranging from 52 to 62 with unit increments. Whereas the price grid is discrete, at each price
S, we allow participants to supply or demand any quantity of the stock in the interval [0; 4].
Thus participants can ne-tune their supply or demand, which enables them to equate marginal
utility and price when they select trades in [0; 4].
Once supply and demand curves have been elicited, it would seem natural to simply aggre-
gate and cross them to determine the market clearing price. Two di¢ culties arise, however.
The rst di¢ culty is that discreteness of the price grid could prevent market clearing. The
second di¢ culty is that participants could behave strategically and try to manipulate the price.
To address these issues, we consider the two following pricing mechanisms:
1. In the call mechanism, the price is set to minimize the gap between supply and demand.10
This is in line with the call market mechanism in Smith, Williams, Bratton, and Vannoni
(1982), McCabe, Rassenti and Smith (1993) or Plott and Pogolreslskyi (2015). The main
di¤erence is that in these papers participants submit schedules of limit orders, while in
9These restrictions, in particular, forbid short sales, which would anyhow not arise in equilibrium with risk
averse agents.
10In the very few instances in which several prices minimized the gap between supply and demand, we drew
one of them randomly.
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ours they submit demand functions. While limit order schedules give rise to monotonic
demand curves, the demand curves we elicit can be nonmonotonic.11 As mentioned
above, because we consider a discrete pricing grid, at the price minimizing the gap between
supply and demand, there is typically rationing. To make sure this consideration does
not a¤ect the choices of the participants, we supply or demand the quantity of stock
needed to clear the market. Thus participantsorders are fully executed. In practice
the additional supply or demand injected in the market by the experimenter averaged to
6.52% of the minimum between supply and demand during the call sessions. This way to
handle potential mismatch between supply and demand ensures that participants behave
as predicted by the competitive model.12
2. In the random mechanism, the price is drawn from the price grid, each price being equally
likely. As in the call mechanism, participantsorders are fully executed. This random
mechanism is in line with the Becker, Degroot and Marshack (1964) mechanism. While
in Becker, Degroot and Marshack (1964) each participant trades one or zero unit, in our
mechanism, participants can trade any amount between 0 and 4.
At the beginning of each replication of the experiment, all participants are told which
mechanism (random or call) will be used to set the price. Strategic considerations could a¤ect
11In the the standard competitive equilibrium model too, demand curves may be non monotonic, due to the
tradeo¤ between substitution and wealth e¤ects.
12If instead we had used a rationing scheme, it could have a¤ected behaviour. For example, participants
anticipating prorata rationing may be tempted to inate their demand.
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participantsbehaviour when they know their orders will be processed in the call mechanism,
but not when they know the random mechanism will be used to set the price. Therefore,
comparing the two enables us to test whether strategic considerations signicantly a¤ected
participantsbehaviour. If they do not, then the call mechanism provides a good approximation
of a competitive market.
3 Testable Implications of Rational Choice
In this section we outline the testable implications arising in our simple experimental setting.
3.1 Individual Behaviour
Denote by W i(u; S) and W i(d; S) the nal wealth of agent i, for a given price S, in states u
and d respectively. For each price, W i(u; S) and W i(d; S) are pinned down by the quantity
chosen by the agent at that price. Because the two states are equally likely, the expectation of
the nal wealth of i is
i(S) =
W i(u; S) +W i(d; S)
2
;
while its standard deviation is
i(S) =
jW i(u; S) W i(d; S)j
2
:
When W i(u; S) > W i(d; S),
W i(u; S) = i(S) + i(S); W
i(d; S) = i(S)  i(S):
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When W i(u; S) < W i(d; S),
W i(u; S) = i(S)  i(S); W i(d; S) = i(S) + i(S):
Putting the two cases together, because the two states are equiprobable, the lottery faced by
agent i is equivalent to the lottery (i(S) + i(S);
1
2
;i(S)  i(S); 12) (irrespective of whether
W i(u; S) > W i(d; S) or W i(u; S) < W i(d; S)). Hence, in our simple empirical design, if
0i(S) > i(S), then (
0
i(S) + i(S);
1
2
;0i(S)   i(S); 12) rst-order stochastically dominates
(i(S) + i(S);
1
2
;i(S)  i(S); 12), as illustrated in Figure 1.
The class of preferences for which agents exhibit preference for rst order stochastic dom-
inant shifts is very large. It includes, for instance, expected utility with the only requirement
that utility increase in wealth, Frechet-di¤erentiable utility with increasing local utility func-
tions (see Machina, 1982), or rankdependent expected utility (Quiggin, 1982). We hereafter
refer to agents with preferences in this class as FOSD agents. As explained below, our sym-
metric two state setup generates clear predictions for FOSD agents.
Our experimental design also enables us to test the implications of risk aversion. An agent
is risk averse if she prefers any lottery than a meanpreserving spread of that lottery. Symmet-
rically, an agent is risk loving if she prefers a mean preserving spread of any lottery than that
lottery. Following Segal and Spivak (1990), we will say that an agent exhibits second-order risk
aversion whenever the risk premium she requires for a small bet is proportional to the square
of the size of that bet. Intuitively, this means the agent is almost risk neutral for small bets.
By contrast, an agent exhibits rst-order risk aversion whenever the risk premium is propor-
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tional to the size of the bet. In that case the agent may be willing to pay a premium to buy
insurance against a small risk. We spell out below the consequences of rst- and second-order
risk aversion in our setting.
Type 1 If a Type 1 participant sells Q shares of the stock at price S, her nal wealth in
states u and d is
W i(u; S) = 600 + (S   120)Q; (1)
W i(d; S) = 360 + S Q: (2)
(1) and (2) imply that the mean and standard deviation of is nal wealth are i(S) =
(S  60)Q+ 480 and i(S) = 60 jQ  2j, respectively. Therefore, two possible trades 2 + x
and 2  x lead to equally volatile nal wealth, for all x 2 (0; 2]. However, if the price is strictly
lower than the expected dividend, i.e., S < 60, selling 2 + x shares leads to a lower expected
nal wealth than selling 2   x shares, while for S > 60, the converse holds. Hence, trading
2 + x shares is rst order stochastically dominated by trading 2  x shares when S < 60, while
the converse holds when S > 60.13
13The cdfs for the lotteries generated by selling 2+x shares and 2 x are identical to those represented in Figure
1, withW i(u; S)j2+x = i i,W i(d; S)j2 x = 0i i,W i(d; S)j2+x = i+i andW i(u; S)j2 x = 0i+i. Note
that W i(u; S)j2 x W i(d; S)j2 x, while W i(u; S)j2+x W i(d; S)j2+x. Yet, the rst step in the cdf is the same
for both lotteries (going from 0 to .5). This property of the cdfs, which delivers the rst-order dominance result,
obtains because the two states are equiprobable. For arbitary probabilities, rst order stochastic dominance
does not always obtain, as illustrated in the gure in the online appendix. Hence equiprobability is instrumental
in yielding sharp testable implications.
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Moreover, if an agent is riskloving or risk neutral, it is optimal for her to supply 4 shares
at any price S > 60 (and 0 shares at any price S < 60). To see that selling 4 shares is preferred
to selling 4  x shares for all x 2 (0; 4] when S > 60, compare the lottery generated by selling
4   x to that generated by selling 4 shares. The latter is equal to the former, plus a positive
constant (x(S   60)), plus a mean preserving spread (( 60x; 1
2
; 60x; 1
2
)). Indeed:
W i(u; S)jQ=4 W i(u; S)jQ=4 x = [600 + (S   120) 4] [600 + (S   120) (4  x)] = x(S 60) 60x
and
W i(d; S)jQ=4  W i(d; S)jQ=4 x = [360 + S  4]  [360 + S  (4  x)] = x(S   60) + 60x:
What if S = 60? Type 1 participants are perfectly hedged if they sell 2 shares. Any other
trade generates a mean preserving spread around that safe outcome. Hence, when S = 60,
a risk-averse Type 1 participant nds it optimal to sell exactly two shares. Symmetrically, a
risk loving participant prefers to take as much risk as possible at that price, which can done,
equivalently, by selling 0 or 4 shares. Risk neutral agents are indi¤erent between any quantity
in [0; 4]. The remarks above yield the following implication.
Implication 1  If a Type 1 participant is an FOSD agent, she does not sell more than 2
shares at S < 60; nor sell less than 2 shares at S > 60. If she is riskloving or riskneutral,
she sells 0 shares at S < 60; and 4 shares at S > 60.
 If a Type 1 participant is risk averse (resp. riskloving), she supplies 2 shares (resp. 0 or
4 shares) at S = 60. If she is risk-neutral she is indi¤erent between all trades at S = 60.
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To illustrate this implication, Figure 2, Panel A, depicts the choices of Type 1 agents in the
pricequantity plane. The relevant prices are between 52 and 62, the relevant quantities are
between 0 and 4, and there are four quadrants determined by the horizontal line Q = 2 and
the vertical line S = 60. If follows from Implication 1 that the North-West and South-East
quadrants are dominated for an FOSDagent. Moreover, a risk-averse Type 1 agents supply
function goes through the point (60; 2).
Type 2 If a Type 2 participant buys Q shares of the stock at price S, her nal wealth in
states u and d is
W i(u; S) = 310 + (120  S)Q; (3)
W i(d; S) = 550  S Q: (4)
Following similar steps as for Type 1, we obtain the following implication.
Implication 2  If a Type 2 participant is an FOSDagent, she does not buy less than 2
shares at S < 60; or more than 2 shares at S > 60. If this participant is riskloving, she
buys 4 shares at S < 60; and 0 shares at S > 60.
 If a Type 2 participant is risk averse (resp. riskloving), she buys 2 shares (resp. 0 or 4
shares) at S = 60.
This implication is illustrated in Panel B of Figure 2, which is the mirror image of Panel A.
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Type 3 In contrast with Type 1 and Type 2 participants, Type 3 participants start with
a riskless initial endowment. Thus, trading increases their riskexposure. More precisely, if
a Type 3 participant buys Q shares of the stock at price S, her nal wealth is W i(u; S) =
310 + (120  S)Q, and W i(d; S) = 310  S Q, in states u and d respectively. This can be
rewritten as
W i(u; S) = 310 + (60  S)Q+ 60Q; (5)
W i(d; S) = 310 + (60  S)Q  60Q: (6)
(5) and (6) show that, relative to the safe endowment of Type 3, trading Q adds a constant
((60   S)  Q) plus a mean preserving spread (( 60Q; 1
2
; 60Q; 1
2
)). Therefore, we obtain the
following implication, illustrated in Figure 2, Panel C.
Implication 3 When S > 60, a risk averse Type 3 agent strictly prefers not to buy any share.
When S < 60, a risk loving Type 3 agent strictly prefers to buy 4 shares
The restrictions imposed by theory for Type 3 are weaker than for Type 1 and Type 2,
since there are no robust theoretical predictions for risk averse participants when S  60, or
risk loving participants when S  60.
3.2 Equilibrium Outcomes
Treatment 1 In Treatment 1, there are N Type 1 participants, N Type 2 participants, and
possibly one Type 3 participant. By Implications 1, 2 and 3, if all participants are risk averse,
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at S = 60 Type 1 should sell two shares, Type 2 buy shares two and Type 3 trade 0 share.
Thus, if all participants are risk averse, S = 60 is an equilibrium, with trading volume 2N .
Is it the only equilibrium? At price S > 60, by Implication 1, supply is at least 2N . Thus, by
Implications 2 and 3, S > 60 can be an equilibrium only if at that price all Type 2 participants
buy 2 shares. Now, if Type 2 participants exhibit nite second-order risk aversion, for any "
small enough, buying 2 shares is dominated by trading 2 " shares (see Segal and Spivak, 1990).
Indeed, relative to the safe lottery obtained when buying two shares, trading 2  " shares adds
a small gamble, with positive expected prot, a gamble that nitely second-order risk averse
participants will accept. Consequently, there cannot exist an equilibrium with price strictly
above 60 (and symmetric arguments rule out an equilibrium with price strictly below 60). The
above remarks yield our fourth implication.
Implication 4 In Treatment 1, if all participants are nitely risk-averse, there exists an equi-
librium such that S = 60, Type 1 participants sell 2 shares, Type 2 participants buy 2 shares,
and Type 3 participants do not trade. If participants are nitely second-order risk averse, the
equilibrium is unique.
The intuition is the following. In Treatment 1, aggregate wealth is constant across states.
Thus, in equilibrium risk averse agents perfectly hedge their risk exposure and the price does
not reect any riskpremium, it is simply equal to the expected dividend.14 With expected
14While the equilibrium analysis underlying Implication 4 is conducted in a perfect market, with continuous
prices, it also applies in our experimental setting with a discrete price grid, because the equilibrium price S = 60
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utility maximization, this is an instance of the mutuality principle (Borch, 1962). In our simple
experimental design, it obtains as soon as agents exhibit second-order risk aversion.
Treatment 2 In Treatment 2, there are only Type 1 and Type 3 participants. By Implication
1, if they exhibit FOSD preference, Type 1 agents sell at least 2 shares at any price above 60.
By Implication 3, if Type 3 participants are risk averse they dont buy any share at any price
above 60. If participants are FOSD and risk averse, their preferences are monotone and convex
in statecontingent consumption, hence there exists an equilibrium. This yields the following
implication.
Implication 5 In Treatment 2, if participants are FOSD and risk averse, there exists an equi-
librium and the equilibrium price is lower than or equal to 60.
As FOSD risk averse Type 1 participants sell less than 2 shares at any price lower than 60,
equations (1) and (2) imply that their equilibrium consumption is larger in state u than in state
d. Moreover, FOSD risk averse Type 3 participants prefer to trade non negative quantities at
any price lower than 60. Hence equations (5) and (6) imply that their equilibrium consumption
is larger in state u than in state d. Thus, individual equilibrium consumptions comove with
aggregate endowment. This extends, in our simple context, the mutuality principle (Borch,
1962) slightly beyond the expected utility case.
The gap between the expected dividend of the stock (60) and its equilibrium price (S) is the
risk premium requested by risk averse agents to bear aggregate risk. Uniqueness of equilibrium
belongs to the pricing grid.
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is not guaranteed in general, but if participants are risk averse expected utility maximizers
with relative risk aversion  wvi00(w)=vi0(w)  1; 8w and i, then substitution e¤ects dominate
income e¤ects and the equilibrium is unique.15
4 Is the Evidence Consistent with Rational Choice and
Competitive Behaviour?
We ran the experiment with 141 participants. All of them were students enrolled in the rst
year of Toulouse Universitys master in nance.16 There were 8 cohorts. All participated in
8 replications of the experiment, lasting, overall, one hour and a half (but for one of the
cohorts an operational problem prevented us from collecting the data for the last replication).
Treatment 1 (corresponding to no aggregate risk) and Treatment 2 (corresponding to aggregate
risk alternated during the 8 replications. Also, for half the cohorts, the rst four replications
involved random prices, while the last four replications involved a call auction. For the other
cohorts, the rst four replications involved a call auction, while the last four replications involved
random prices. The details of the experimental sessions are documented in the table in the
15The condition ensures that the aggregate excess demand function for state-contingent wealth satises the
gross substitute property, see Varian (1985) or Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995, Example 17.F.2 and
Proposition 17.F.3, pp. 612613).
16These students come from di¤erent backgrounds. The majority studied management, and had very little
exposure to micro-economic or nance theory. Some studied economics, and had greater exposure to microeco-
nomics, but not to nance theory. Others come from engineering or maths.
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online appendix.
For each group, two of the eight rounds were randomly drawn at the end of the experiment,
one from sessions with random pricing and the other from sessions with a call auction. As
announced at the start of the experiment, participants received the sum of their nal wealths
in these two rounds, divided by ten. The average individual payment was e 85.84, the minimum
was e 5 and the maximum e 120. We ran an anonymous survey among the participants, asking
them their monthly budget (including all expenses: housing, food, leisure, etc.). The average
was e 646. Thus, the amount participants could make in the lab, and its variability, were
signicant relative to their budget in the eld.17 Overall, 68 participants were assigned the role
of Type 1 sellers, 68 participants were switching from Type 2 to Type 3 buyers depending on
the treatment, and 5 participants were assigned the role of Type 3 buyers.
4.1 Aggregate Outcomes
In this section we study aggregate supply and demand and market pricing. First, we report
the evidence on whether supply and demand reect strategic behaviour. In half the replica-
tions of the experiment, the price at which participants traded was randomly drawn. For the
other replications the price was set to minimize the gap between supply and demand. To test
17Bossaerts and Plott (2004) compare participantsbehaviour in asset market in the US and in Bulgaria. The
experimental design was the same in the two countries, but monetary incentives were much stronger in Bulgaria.
Bossaerts and Plott (2004) nd qualitatively similar results. In both countries there is a risk premium. The
main di¤erence is that the risk premium is larger in Bulgaria.
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the null hypothesis of competitive behaviour, we ran Wilcoxon ranksum tests comparing the
distribution of quantities o¤ered or demanded at each price in the two mechanisms.18 As il-
lustrated in Figure 3, the pvalue was above 10% in all cases but 4 (out of 44). This does not
suggest rejection of the null hypothesis of competitive behaviour. Accordingly, when analyzing
aggregate outcomes we hereafter pool the observations from the two pricing mechanisms (ex-
cept in Figure 5, panel C and D, below, which documents further the similarity in participants
behaviour between call and random price treatments.)
Figure 4 plots the average across cohorts of the price minimizing the distance between
aggregate supply and aggregate demand.19 For each of the two treatments (Treatment 1 without
aggregate risk, and Treatment 2 with aggregate risk), each of the eight cohorts played four
replications. The solid line in Figure 4 plots the price (averaged across 8 cohorts) for the rst,
second, third and fourth Treatment 1 replications. The dashed line plots the average prices
18At each price level, we rst computed for each individual the average quantity in four cases: random
mechanism/aggregate risk, random mechanism/no aggregate risk, call/aggregate risk and call/no aggregate
risk. So, since there are 8 replications, we computed an average quantity across 2 replications for each subject.
Then, for each of the 11 prices level, we ran separate Wilcoxon ranksum tests to examine if the quantity traded
di¤ers in the random mechanism and the call market. We ran these tests separately for buyers and sellers, and
for Treatment 1 and Treatment 2. So we computed 4 times 11 statistics. For each, the null hypothesis is that
the distribution across subjects of quantities for the random price mechanisms is equal to its counterpart for
the call mechanism.
19For the replications relying on a call market, but not for those with random pricing, this was the actual
price in the market.
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for Treatment 2. The gure shows that, during the rst two replications, average prices are
similar in the two treatments (close to 58). During the last two replications, in Treatment 1,
the average market price increases and converges to the expected dividend (60) as predicted
by theory (see Implication 4 above). In contrast in Treatment 2, the average market price
decreases and converges close to 57. The di¤erence between the expected dividend (60) and the
average price (57) in Treatment 2 can be interpreted in terms of risk premium, and is consistent
with the prediction from theory for risk averse participants (see Implication 5 above). With a
price of 57 and an expected nal value of 60, the riskpremium is 5.26%. For a representative
investor endowed with the aggregate wealth and with power utility function, this corresponds
to a relative risk aversion coe¢ cient a bit lower than .5, in line with evidence from other
experiments infering riskaversion from participantsbehaviour.20
To shed light on aggregate demand and supply in our experimental market, we aggregate all
the supply and demand curves from all Type 1 and Type 2 participants for Treatment 1, and
from all Type 1 and Type 3 participants for Treatment 2. It is legitimate to do so because, in
our competitive setting, individual demands and supplies are independent of the number and
characteristics of the other market participants.
Figure 5, Panel A, depicts aggregate demand and supply in Treatment 1 (divided by the
number of participantsreplications, to facilitate interpretations). Demand is approximately
decreasing and supply approximately increasing. Quite strikingly, the price minimizing the
20See Holt and Laury (2002) for lottery choices, Goeree et al (2002) for private value auctions, Goeree et al
(2003) for asymmetric matching penny games, and Goeree and Holt (2004) for oneshot matrix games.
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gap between supply and demand is 60, which is the equilibrium price predicted by theory (see
Implication 4 above). At that price, trading volume per participant is very close to the two
shares predicted by theory for risk averse agents (see Implication 4 above).
Figure 5, Panel B, depicts aggregate demand and supply in Treatment 2. As predicted by
theory, supply is not very di¤erent from its counterpart in Panel A. In contrast, as predicted by
theory for risk averse agents, demand is lower than in Panel A. Correspondingly, the price min-
imizing the gap between supply and demand is lower than the expected dividend, as predicted
by theory for risk averse agents (see Implication 5 above).
The next two panels of Figure 5 depict aggregate supply and demand in the call and random
price mechanisms, in Treatment 1 and 2, respectively. They illustrate that aggregate supply
and demand are very similar in the call and the random price mechanisms.
4.2 Individual Outcomes
The evidence on aggregate outcomes suggests our experimental market conforms rather well
to the predictions of theory. We now turn to the analysis of individual outcomes, to study
whether well behaved aggregate outcomes stem from well behaved individual actions.
Inspecting individual supply and demand curves reveals signicant heterogeneity in indi-
vidual behaviour. To illustrate this, Figure 6 plots the supply functions of four di¤erent Type
1 participants in Treatment 1. The behaviour depicted in Panel A is quite noisy, and involves
several dominated actions, in contradiction with Implication 1. In contrast, the behaviour de-
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picted in Panel B is very steady and conforms to the prediction of theory for an innitely risk
averse expected utility maximizer. Two other examples are in Panel C, where the participants
behaviour conforms to the prediction of theory for nite risk aversion, and Panel D, where
the participants behaviour is optimal for a risk loving or risk neutral agent (both in line with
Implication 1). Which one of these examples is more representative of the data? We hereafter
quantify the extent to which individual actions conform to the predictions of rational choice.
Implications 1 and 2 o¤er sharp predictions for rational supply and demand: For example,
supplying more than two shares at S < 60, or less than two shares at S > 60 is a dominated
action for an FOSD Type 1 agent. Symmetrically, demanding less than two shares at S < 60,
or more than two shares at S > 60 is a dominated action for an FOSD Type 2 agent.
To test the predictions from theory, we compute the frequency of dominated and undom-
inated actions at prices other than 60 for Type 1 or 2 agents.21 As mentioned above, 68
participants, in our experimental market, were of Type 1 (i.e., they were sellers). Each par-
ticipated in 8 replications of the market. For each of these participants, and each replication,
we computed the proportion of dominated actions across the 10 possible prices.22 We then
computed, for each replication, the average across 68 participants of this proportion. The solid
line in Figure 7, Panel A, plots this average, while the dashed line are the 10% condence inter-
val. Figure 7, Panel B, o¤ers a similar plot for the 68 Type 2 (buyers) participants. For these
participants there are only 4 replications. During the 4 other replications these participants
21At price 60, or for Type 3 agents, there are no dominated actions.
22There are 11 possible prices, but at price 60 there is no dominated action.
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were of Type 3, for which we are not able to dene dominated actions without making any
parametric restriction on preferences.
Inspecting Panel A, one can see that, for sellers, the average proportion of dominated actions
starts around 35% at the rst replication, and declines to 25% at the last replication. It is always
signicantly lower than 50%. Hence we reject the pure noise hypothesis that participants simply
choose randomly any quantity between 0 and 4. The proportion of dominated actions is also
always signicantly larger than 0. Hence we reject the fully rational choice hypothesis. Similarly,
Panel B shows that, for buyers, the frequency of dominated actions starts from slightly less than
35% at the rst replication and then steadily declines to less than 25% at the last replication.
Again, both pure noise and fully rational choice are rejected. Thus, participants are not fully
rational, but learn to play more rationally as they become more experienced.
Further statistical evidence is o¤ered in Table 1. The table displays estimates for probit
regressions in which the dependent variable is the indicator that an action is rst-order sto-
chastically dominated. Our data include a total of 12,287 observations: one per participant,
per period and per price. We focus on Type 1 and Type 2 participants and on prices di¤erent
from 60, because these are the cases in which we can identify rst order stochastically domi-
nated actions. This leaves us with 8,110 observations. We further drop 520 observations that
correspond to the 8 participants who never played any dominated action. We thus end up with
7,590 observations.
We control for individual and price xed e¤ects. The main regressor of interest is a proxy for
the participants experience, equal to the number of periods during which he/she has already
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participated. In all the specications, this variable is signicantly negative, suggesting that
experience reduces the propensity to choose dominated actions. Another regressor of interest
is the indicator that the replication involved random pricing. Its estimated coe¢ cient is not
signicantly di¤erent from zero, consistent with the hypothesis that participants behave in the
same way in the random pricing and the market clearing environments. To further analyse
learning in our experiment, the third specication (in column 3) involves three additional
indicator variables: i) the indicator that the price has previously been selected as transaction
price, ii) the indicator that the agent has already played a dominated action at that price and
iii) the indicator that this dominated action led to a loss-making trade. The indicator that the
price has been previously selected as transaction price is not signicant. This suggests that
participants do not consider more carefully prices at which they have previously transacted.
The indicator that the agent has already played a dominated action at that price is signicantly
positive. This suggests there is an element of inertia in participantsactions: they tend to repeat
previous choices. However, the indicator that the agent has previously chosen a dominated
action at that price and correspondingly incurred a loss is signicantly negative. This suggests
participants learn from their mistakes when the latter are costly.
5 Reconciling the Evidence with Quasi-rational Choice
The above reported ndings are puzzling. On the one hand, aggregate outcomes are very much
in line with the implications of rational choice. On the other hand, a large fraction of individual
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actions are inconsistent with rational choice. The latter suggests bounded rationality, the former
that individual boundedly rational choices add up to rationalaggregate outcomes. Thus, to
reconcile the di¤erent aspects of our experimental ndings, we o¤er a bounded rationality
model of individual choice in line with quantal response models (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995
and 1998), we derive its empirical implications and we confront them to the data.
5.1 Bounded Rationality and Random Actions
As in Luce (1959) we assume that, instead of selecting the deterministic optimal action, players
choose randomly among actions, putting larger probability on actions generating higher value.23
At a given price (S), each possible quantity qi 2 [0; 4]; o¤ered or demanded at that price,
delivers a given rational value function for agent i: Vi(qi; S). We assume that the probability
that agent i opts for quantity qi at price S is increasing in Vi(qi; S). More precisely, for each
agent i we assume there exists an increasing function i such that the density of qi is
fi(qi;S) =
i(Vi(qi; S))R 4
0
i(Vi(q; S))dq
: (7)
Because i is increasing, Vi(q; S) > Vi(q^; S) is equivalent to fi(q;S) > fi(q^;S), for all (q; q^) 2
[0; 4]2. That is, actions giving a larger rational value function are more likely to be chosen. A
special case is i(Vi(qi; S)) = exp(iVi(qi; S)) in which the parameter i measures the respon-
23In our competitive setting, agents only need to condition on the price, and dont need to form expectations
about the actions of the others. Hence, our framework is simpler than that of quantal response equilibrium, in
which players choose among strategies... based on their relative utility... and assume other players do so as
well.(McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995).
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siveness of the agent to di¤erences in valuation, as in McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) and Luce
(1959).
5.2 Implications of First Order Stochastic Dominance
5.2.1 At price S = 60
Consider the choice of the amount qi sold by Type 1 agent i at price S = 60. As stated in
Implication 1, if i is risk averse, he nds it optimal to choose qi = 2. Otherwise stated,
Vi(2; S = 60)  Vi(q; S = 60);8q 2 [0; 4]:
By (7), this implies
fi(2; S = 60)  fi(q; S = 60);8q 2 [0; 4]:
That is, for a risk averse agent, fi reaches its maximum at 2, which is the mode of the distrib-
ution of qi.
Now consider two possible choices: qi = 2 x and qi = 2+x, where x 2 (0; 2]. When S = 60,
they give rise to the same lottery. Hence, Vi(2 x; S = 60) = Vi(2 +x; S = 60);8x 2 (0; 2], and
correspondingly fi(2   x; S = 60) = fi(2 + x; S = 60); 8x 2 (0; 2]. Hence, for a given function
i, at price S = 60, if agents are risk averse the distribution of qi is symmetric around its mean,
equal to 2:
Ei(qi) =
Z 4
0
qfi(q;S)dq =
Z 4
0
q
i(Vi(q; S))R 4
0
i(Vi(q; S))dq
dq = 2; (8)
where the expectation is parametrised by the function i of agent i. Now suppose the i of the
participants are independent draws from the same distribution. Then we have that the qi are
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i.i.d random variables, such that, at price S = 60, by the law of large numbers
PN
i=1 qi
N
! 2;
with probability 1 as N goes to innity. Thus, as stated in the next implication (whose proof is
in appendix), aggregate market outcomes should go to rational competitive equilibrium when
the number of participants goes to innity.
Implication 6 When participants behave according to (7), if they are risk averse, as the
number of participants goes to innity, the aggregate outcome in Treatment 1 goes to that
arising with rational choice: The equilibrium price goes to the expected dividend, 60, and the
average peragent trade goes to the full hedge trade, 2.
Implication 6 rationalizes the empirical ndings presented in the previous section. When
participants behave according to (7), individual behaviour is noisy and involves dominated
actions. Yet, as the number of participants grows large, the aggregate outcome goes to the
rational choice equilibrium outcome. In particular, in Treatment 1, in which there is no aggre-
gate risk, the price minimizing the wedge between supply and demand is on average equal to
the expected dividend and the average transaction at that price is 2.
5.2.2 At price S 6= 60
Now turn to participantschoices at other prices than 60. Consider the supply of a risk averse
Type 1 agent at price S < 60. As shown in the analysis leading to Implication 1, for prices
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below 60, selling less than 2 rst order stochastically dominates selling more than 2, hence
Vi(2   x; S) > Vi(2 + x; S), 8 x 2 (0; 2]. By (7), this implies fi(2   x; S) > fi(2 + x; S). That
is, agent i plays dominated actions less often than non-dominated ones, which implies
Fi(2 + x; S)  Fi(2 + x; S) < Fi(2  x; S)  Fi(2  x; S);8S < 60;80  x  x  2;
where Fi(q; S) denotes the cdf of quantity q at price S, when i behaves according to (7).
Symmetric arguments apply for Type 2. Our next implication follows from the Glivenko
Cantelli Theorem.
Implication 7 When participants are FOSD and behave according to (7), as the number of
Type 1 participants goes to innity, the empirical distribution of their actions is such that
Pr

#observations in [2 + x; 2 + x]
N
<
#observations in [2  x; 2  x]
N

(9)
converges to 1 for S < 60 and to 0 for S > 60. Similarly, for Type 2 agents (9) converges to 0
for S < 60 and to 1 for S > 60.
Implication 7 states that, in a large population of FOSD agents behaving according to
(7), the distribution of demand and supply is asymmetric around q = 2. This implies that
undominated actions (on one side of q = 2) should be more frequent than dominated actions
(on the other side of q = 2), as is the case in the data. To examine an intuitive subset of
additional restrictions imposed by Implication 7, it is helpful to dene large and small risk-
exposures. As explained in Subsection 3.1, when Type 1 or Type 2 participants trade exactly
two shares, they are perfectly hedged, as their nal wealth is the same in the two states. In
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contrast, whenever they trade 2 + x or 2  x, x 2 (0; 2], they are exposed to risk. The larger x,
the more volatile their nal wealth, i.e., the larger their risk-exposure. Thus, we dene trades
with x 2 (0; 1] as leading to small risk-exposure, and those with x 2 (1; 2] as leading to large
risk-exposure. Of course, as explained in Subsection 3.1, a large risk-exposure (or a small one)
can correspond to a rst-order stochastically (FOS) undominated trade (if, e.g., the agent sells
more than 2 shares at price S > 60) or a FOS-dominated trade (e.g., if the agent sells strictly
less than 2 shares at price S > 60).
Relying on this categorisation, Figure 8 o¤ers more evidence on the extent to which the data
are in line with Implication 7. The left column of Figure 8 depicts histograms of the distribution
of quantities o¤ered by Type 1 participants. The top row corresponds to quantities o¤ered at
prices strictly lower than 60, while the middle row corresponds to quantities o¤ered at prices
strictly higher than 60, and the bottom row corresponds to quantities o¤ered at price 60.
The right column of Figure 8 o¤ers similar information for quantities demanded by Type 2
participants.
For the left column and the top row of Figure 8, corresponding to sales at prices lower than
60, in line with Implication 7, the empirical distribution of actions is asymmetric around 2,
putting more weight on large FOS-undominated risk-exposures (q 2 [0; 1)) than on large FOS-
dominated risk-exposures (q 2 (3; 4]), and also more weight on small FOS-undominated risk-
exposures (q 2 [1; 2)) than on small FOS-dominated risk-exposures (q 2 (2; 3]). Symmetrically,
for the middle row of the left column, corresponding to sales at prices larger than 60, the
histogram is asymmetric around 2, again putting more weight on large FOS-undominated risk-
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exposures (q 2 (3; 4]) than on large FOS-dominated risk-exposures q 2 [0; 1), and also more
weight on small FOS-undominated risk-exposures (q 2 (2; 3]) than on small FOS-dominated
risk exposures (q 2 [1; 2)). Also, for the top row of the right column, corresponding to purchases
at prices lower than 60, in line with Implication 7, large FOS-undominated risk exposures (q 2
(3; 4]) are more frequent than large FOS-dominated risk-exposures (q 2 [0; 1)), and small FOS-
undominated risk-exposures (q 2 (2; 3]) than small FOS-dominated risk-exposures (q 2 [1; 2)).
For the middle row of the right column, while large FOS-undominated risk-exposures are more
frequent than large FOS-dominated risk-exposures, observed frequencies contradict Implication
7 for small risk-exposures.
Overall, the empirical distribution of actions seems rather in line with Implication 7. To o¤er
more statistical information on this point we ran non-parametric sign tests of the null hypothesis
that frequencies of FOS-dominated and undominated actions were the same, controlling for the
size of the corresponding risk-exposure. To do so as simply as possible, we pooled data across
prices above and below 60. Thus, for example, for Type-1 (sellers), we pooled FOS-undominated
sales at prices above 60 (with q 2 (2; 4]) with FOS-undominated sales a prices below 60 (with
q 2 [0; 2)). The resulting pooled frequencies are in Table 2. The p-value for the null hypothesis
that the frequency or large FOS-undominated risk-exposures is equal to that of large FOS-
dominated ones is 1.36% for sellers and 0.01% for buyers. For the null hypothesis that the
frequency or small FOS-undominated risk-exposures is equal to that of small FOS-dominated
ones the p-value is .45% for sellers and .13% for buyers. Thus, in all cases, the null hypothesis
is rejected, in line Implication 7.
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Figure 9, describes the evolution of the frequencies of small and large FOS-dominated ac-
tions, as participants become more experienced. The two full lines plot the frequencies of
FOS-dominated actions leading to large and small risk exposures respectively, while the dashed
lines depict 90% condence intervals.24 In each category (large and small risk-exposures), the
frequencies of dominated actions decline as participants get more experienced.
5.3 Implications of Second Order Stochastic Dominance
5.3.1 Individual actions
While rst order dominance enables one to rank the frequency of dominated and undomi-
nated actions, second order stochastic dominance enables one to rank the frequency of di¤erent
dominated actions, as stated in our next implication (whose proof is in appendix).
Implication 8 For Type 1, for S < 60, selling 2 + x is second order stochastically dominated
by selling 2 + x, 80  x  x  2, while for S > 60, selling x is second order stochastically
dominated by selling x, 80  x  x  2. Similarly, for Type 2, for S > 60, buying 2 + x is
second order stochastically dominated by buying 2 + x , 80  x  x  2, while for S < 60
buying x is second order stochastically dominated by buying x, 80  x  x  2,
Implication 8 predicts that the frequency of large FOS-dominated trades should be lower
than that of small FOS-dominated trades (intuitively, large mistakes should be less frequent
24The full lines plot average across participants of individual frequencies. The condence intervals plotted by
the dashed lines reect standard errors across participants.
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than relatively small ones). Inspection of Figure 8 and Table 2 shows that this is the case in
the data, both for Type 1 and Type 2 participants. To o¤er more statistical information on
this point, again, we ran sign-tests. The p-value for the null hypothesis that the frequency of
large dominated trades is equal to that of small dominated trades is 0.00% for Type 1 (sellers)
and 1.13% for Type 2 (buyers). So we reject the null hypothesis, as requested by Implication
8.
5.3.2 Aggregate Outcomes
While rst and second order stochastic dominance, combined with (7), yields implications for
individual actions, as discussed above, it also yields implications for aggregate market outcomes,
as stated in our next implication (whose proof is in appendix).
Implication 9 If Participants are FOSD and SOSD, then the equilibrium price should be
lower than 60 in Treatment 2.
Implication 8 rationalizes the empirical ndings presented in the previous section that, in
Treatment 2, the price minimizing the wedge between supply and demand is lower than 60.
6 Conclusion
This paper o¤ers an experimental test of the theory of competitive equilibrium in complete
markets.
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Our rst methodological contribution is to design an experimental market that emulates as
closely as possible the standard competitive equilibrium model: i) supply and demand curves
are elicited, aggregated and crossed to set market clearing prices and ii) the hypothesis that
participants are competitive can be tested. Our second methodological contribution is to rely
on the simplicity of the experimental setting to pin down precise testable implications on
individual behaviour, that hold for a very large class of preferences. Our third methodological
contribution is to apply random choice models (in line with Luce (1959) and McKelvey and
Palfrey (1995)) to our experimental market setting, and spell out their implications for the
distribution of individual actions as well as for aggregate outcomes.
Our main experimental ndings are the following:
 At the aggregate level, the experimental complete market conforms to theory. The hy-
pothesis that participants are competitive cannot be rejected. Aggregate supply and
demand cross at the expected dividend when there is no aggregate risk, and at a lower
price when there is.
 Individual participants, however, frequently choose rst order stochastically dominated
actions. Yet, dominated actions become less frequent as participants become more expe-
rienced, and participants seem to learn from their mistakes.
 Our random choice model reconciles the apparently contradictory ndings obtained at
the aggregate and individual levels. It predicts that individual deviations will average
out, leading to well behaved aggregate supply and demand. The random choice model
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also imposes further restrictions on the distribution of individual actions, consistent with
experimental ndings: Dominated actions are less frequent than undominated ones, and
large mistakes are less frequent than small ones.
Our experimental ndings suggest that, when markets are perfect and complete, individual
irrationality does not preclude aggregate outcomes consistent with the predictions of compet-
itive equilibrium. Thus deviations from those predictions, observed in the eld, could stem
from market imperfection and incompleteness, rather than from limited cognition. It will be
interesting, in further work, to extend our methodology to study imperfect markets in the lab.
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Appendix
Proof of Implication 6: By the law of large numbers, if Type 1 participants are risk averse,
at price S = 60 their average supply goes to 2 as the number of Type 1 participants, N1, goes to
innity, i.e., with probability
lim
N1!1
PN1
i=1 q
1
i (60)
N1
= 2; (10)
where q1i (60) denotes the supply of participant Type 1 participant i at price 60.
Symmetrically, the average demand from risk averse Type 2 participants also goes to 2, as the
number of Type 2 participants, N2, goes to innity, i.e.,
lim
N2!1
PN2
i=1 q
2
i (60)
N2
= 2; (11)
where q2i (60) denotes the demand of participant Type 2 participant i at price 60. Now, for S = 60
to be an equilibrium price, we need that
PN1
i=1 q
1
i (60) =
PN2
i=1 q
2
i (60). For nite N1 = N2 this is
equivalent to PN1
i=1 q
1
i (60)
N1
=
PN2
i=1 q
2
i (60)
N2
;
which, by (10) and (11), holds in the limit, as the number of participants goes to innity, if they are
all risk averse. QED
Proof of Implication 8: Consider Type 1 (the proof for Type 2 is symmetric), the lottery
corresponding to the sale of 2 + x has the following two equiprobable outcomes:
W (u; S)jQ=2+x = 600 + (S   120)(2 + x) = 360 + 2S + (S   60)x  60x;
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and
W (d; S)jQ=2+x = 360 + S(2 + x) = 360 + 2S + (S   60)x+ 60x:
The lottery corresponding to the sale of 2 + x has the following two equiprobable outcomes:
W (u; S)jQ=2+x = W (dj2 + x) + (S   60)(x  x)  60(x  x):
W (d; S)jQ=2+x = W (dj2 + x) + (S   60)(x  x) + 60(x  x)
By construction S  60 < 0. Moreover, plus or minus 60(x  x) with equal probability is a mean
preserving spread. Hence ((W (uj2 + x); 1
2
;W (dj2 + x); 1
2
)) is second order stochastically dominated
by ((W (uj2 + x); 1
2
;W (dj2 + x); 1
2
)). Note that, here again, equiprobability is key for the proof. If
S = 60, then 2 + x is a mean preserving spread of 2 + x, since
W (u; S = 60)jQ=2+x = 600 + (60  120)(2 + x) = 480  60x;
and
W (d; S = 60)jQ=2+x = 360 + 60(2 + x) = 480 + 60x;
while
W (u; S = 60)jQ=2+x = W (u; S = 60)jQ=2+x   60(x  x);
and
W (d; S = 60)jQ=2+x = W (d; S = 60)jQ=2+x + 60(x  x):
QED
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Proof of Implication 9: In Treatment 2, for Type 1 agents, selling less than 2 at prices
S > 60 is rst order stochastically dominated. Hence, if participants are FOSD agents and behave
according to (7), expected individual supply at S > 60 is larger than or equal to 2. Hence, by the law
of large numbers
lim
N1!1
PN1
i=1 Si(60)
N1
 2;8S > 60:
For Type 3 agents, buying 2 + x is second order stochastically dominated by 2 + x, 80  x  x  2.
Hence, if participants are FOSD and SOSD agents and behave according to (7), expected individual
demand at S > 60 is strictly lower than 2. Hence, by the law of large numbers
lim
N2!1
PN2
i=1 Di(60)
N2
< 2;8S > 60:
This implies the equilibrium price should be lower than 60. QED
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Table 1: Probit regressions
The dependent variable is an indicator that the action is FOS dominated. Regressions are
estimated over 7,590 actions, by the 128 participants, who chose at least once a dominated
action.
FOS dominated action
(1) (2) (3)
Number of Periods during which the subject participated -0.0563*** -0.0558*** -0.0673***
(-7.98) (-7.91) (-8.80)
Indicator that the replication involved Random Pricing 0.0455 0.0489
(1.43) (1.52)
Indicator that trading already took place at that price -0.0735
(-1.43)
Indicator that subject played dominated action at that price 0.703***
(8.64)
Indicator that dominated action led to loss-making trade -0.365***
(-3.61)
Constant -1.058*** -1.079*** -1.022***
(-5.51) (-5.60) (-5.26)
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001
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Table 2: Empirical frequencies of FOS-undominated and dominated actions
For each of the 68 Type 1 participants, and 68 Type 2 participants, we computed the
frequency of dominated and undominated actions, leading to large risk exposure, small risk
exposure with trade size di¤erent from 2, or trade size equal to 2. We then computed the
average across the 136 participants of these frequencies.
Large Small q = 2 Small Large
undominated undominated dominated dominated
Type 1 (seller) 20% 29% 19% 21% 10%
Type 2 (buyer) 24% 26% 22% 14% 13%
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Figure 1: First order stochastic dominance among lotterries
If μi’ > μi then lottery (μi’,σi) (cdf depicted by dashed red line) 1st order
stochastically dominates lottery (μi,σi) (cdf depicted by full black line) 
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Figure 3: p‐values for Wilcoxon signed‐rank test of H0 that demand 
not significantly different  in call & random price
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Figure 6: Supply functions of 4 participants
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Figure 7, Frequency of first order stochastically dominated actions
Average frequency cross participants (solid line)
90% confidence interval (dashed lines) 
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Figure	8:	Distribution	of	transaction	size	across	participants
Figure 9: Frequency of FOS‐dominated actions leading to large and 
small risk exposure, throughout 4 Treatment 1 replications
Average frequency cross participants (solid line)
90% confidence interval (dashed lines)
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